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Degeneracy, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. 
What the Nazis thought entartet, the civilized world now calls 
Kunst. So it is with abortion in American constitutional law. 
For some, the constitutional protection of abortion has facili-
tated a grim harvest of unborn lives since January 22, 1973. For 
others, "a chill wind blows"1 at the mere thought that abortion 
rights might evaporate for the "entire generation ... come of 
age"2 since Roe v. Wade. 
I demur. The prevailing constitutional debate over abortion 
is a disgrace. Villains abound left and right. Why privilege abor-
tion, the political emblem of bourgeois feminism, over meaning-
ful protection against poverty? What decent system of law ig-
nores crass intergenerational injustice? So much for the hollow 
promise that "[o]ur Constitution is a covenant running" across 
the generations.3 At the other political extreme, much of today's 
religiously motivated social activism effectively suggests that 
Christianity has no relevance after birth and before death. A 
plague on both their houses. 
But one side did win. The conservative jihad against Roe 
failed. Never fear; Constitutional Commentary loves lost causes 
almost as much as it loves wacky fantasies. As between the two 
sets of whiners in the abortion debate, we should let the losers 
have their way. Justice Jude, grant this solitary prayer at mid-
night in the courtroom of good and evil. Roe v. Wade, be gone. 
First, though, let's entertain a suggestion from the patron 
judge of legal desperation. Instead of gracelessly throttling Roe, 
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I. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Biackmun, J., 
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2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 
(1992). 
3. Id at 901. 
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why not eliminate that decision's immediate precedent? There 
is, after all, a respectable argument that protecting contraceptive 
use by atomistic individuals is a nation's surest symptom of 
moral decay. Besides, there lies an immense amount of perverse 
pleasure in playing havoc with the lives of American law stu-
dents, who tend to be unmarried, fertile, and heterosexually ac-
tive. 
Very well then. Stomp that butterfly: let's assume that in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 the Supreme Court refused to guarantee 
unmarried persons a constitutional right of access to contracep-
tives. 
Eisenstadt, truth be told, could have and arguably should 
have confined Griswold v. Connecticut5 to contraceptive use by 
married couples. Stripped of its fundamental rights veneer, 
Eisenstadt would have proved an exceedingly simple application 
of rational basis review. The government has a "strong interest" 
in controlling the sexual activity of young, unmarried hetero-
sexuals.6 And how can a classification disadvantaging unmarried 
persons be suspect? 
Eisenstadt thus reimagined would have dictated the oppo-
site outcome in Roe. Denying a general right to contraception 
surely would have foreclosed any claim that abortion should be a 
fundamental right. Eisenstadt's closest cousin, Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International,7 would also disappear. "If you want 
contraceptives," a state could insist, "visit a pharmacist." The 
Court would have to confess that Griswold must "be read as 
holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple's use 
of contraceptives. "8 Reversing Eisenstadt, Roe, Carey: this is ei-
ther a cultural conservative's lurid fantasy or a progressive's 
nightmare. 
But Roe would hardly represent the Court's final word on 
the civil liberties of pregnant women. The next Term presented 
two opportunities to revisit the issue. Cleveland Board of Edu-
cation v. LaFleur9 invalidated a school board rule requiring 
mandatory leave for pregnant teachers. More pointedly, 
4. 405 u.s. 438 (1972). 
5. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
6. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,470 (1981) (plu-
rality opinion). 
7. 431 u.s. 678 (1977). 
8. ld at 687 (emphasis added). 
9. 414 u.s. 632 (1974). 
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Geduldig v. Aiello10 asked whether the equal protection clause 
prohibits discriminatory treatment of pregnancy. Pregnant per-
sons are, surprised though Justice Stewart might have been to 
discover, invariably female. 
Had a substantive due process theory of abortion failed in 
Roe, Geduldig would have given a creative and opportunistic 
Court the platform for protecting abortion rights as a matter of 
equal protection. Doctrinal uncertainty over sex-based classifi-
cations11 would hardly have prevented Justice Brennan from ar-
guing that equal protection requires careful scrutiny of classifica-
tions based on "physical characteristics inextricably linked to 
one sex." 12 "More is involved than the abstract question whether 
disparate treatment of pregnancy discriminates against a suspect 
class, or whether abortion or childbirth is a fundamental right." 13 
Or so the Burger Court's doctrinal genius might have written. 
"In light of the countervailing costs, discriminatory legislation 
that impairs a woman's control of pregnancy can hardly be con-
sidered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the 
State. "14 
In a world without Roe v. Wade, the right to abortion could 
be rooted in equal protection instead of substantive due process. 
The regulation of abortion, unique as that medical procedure is 
to women, would have to survive comparisons with the regula-
tion of equivalent medical practices affecting men alone, or both 
men and women. Although Roe in real life stressed the primacy 
of the doctor-patient relationship, it is hard to imagine how the 
loss of a fundamental rights fa~ade could have altered the Su-
preme Court's seemingly ad hoc approach to the regulation of 
abortion as a medical procedure.15 Unemancipated, unmarried 
girls have never had much freedom to end their unwanted preg-
nancies. Only once did the Court under Roe invalidate a paren-
tal notice or consent law that allowed some sort of judicial by-
10. 417 U.S.484 (1974). 
II. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
12. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf., e.g., Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roc v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. 
Rev. 375, 386 (1985) (suggesting that the right to abortion should have been framed as a 
question of equal protection). 
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,223 (1982) (altered quotation). 
14. ld. at 224 (altered quotation). 
15. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouriv. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); City 
of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh 
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
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pass.16 Modern substantive due process originated, after all, in 
cases defending the rights of parents to rear their children. 17 No 
doctrine, whether rooted in substantive due process or in equal 
protection, is likely to dislodge the dogma that parents know 
best. 
The upshot is that Roe was no prize. As the weakness of the 
funding cases showed, 18 Roe was scarcely a robust specimen of 
fundamental rights jurisprudence. Protecting abortion rights as 
a matter of equal protection would have fared no worse than 
Roe's imperfect substantive due process strategy. 19 Superior tex-
tual legitimacy would be a nice bonus, a luscious lagniappe. 
One nagging problem remains. How could the Court have 
denied the claims in Eisenstadt and Roe without overruling 
Griswold? Why, of course, by stressing that portion of Griswold 
which enshrined marriage as "an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any" other, a "coming together ... intimate to the de-
gree of being sacred. "20 Thanks to the Court's heroic efforts to 
distinguish between the use of contraceptives by married couples 
and their use by unmarried individuals, the notion of marriage 
would emerge as a full-fledged fundamental right. The seeds 
planted in Lovinl1 and Boddie22 would finally bear fruit. 
Eliminating Eisenstadt would therefore spark two dramatic 
doctrinal changes. First, equal protection of the sexes would ex-
plicitly secure the right of women to seek the full range of medi-
cal responses to pregnancy, including abortion. Stomping Eisen-
stadt would coincidentally crush Roe, but Geduldig would have 
filled that vacant jurisprudential niche. Second, marriage rather 
than reproductive self-determination would animate the con-
16. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Compare Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 
U.S. 292 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a parental-rights provision with judicial bypass); 
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (same); Planned Par-
enthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (same) with Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
U.S. 417 (1990) (invalidating a parental-rights provision without judicial bypass); H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (same). 
17. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
18. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); 
see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 
U.S. 490 (1989). 
19. Sec David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 1, 27. 
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965). 
21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
22. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
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temporary view of fundamental rights of privacy and person-
hood. 
Practically speaking, these doctrinal transformations would 
reverse the actual law on access to contraceptives but preserve 
(or even expand) the constitutional protection of abortion. 
Without Eisenstadt, unmarried Americans would have no right 
to contraceptives, but adult women, regardless of marital status, 
would enjoy relatively free access to abortion. A modest but 
creative extension of equal protection would preserve abortion 
law more or less as we know it. A fundamental rights jurispru-
dence based on marriage rather than reproductive autonomy 
would reinforce rather than negate the Supreme Court's hostility 
to requiring a married woman to consult her husband before 
seeking an abortion.23 In its sexual mores if not its economic af-
fairs, the United States of this imaginary legal universe would re-
semble the very real nations of the former Soviet bloc. Or per-
haps America would resemble Japan, which only recently 
legalized oral contraceptives. Abortion would be a common 
method of birth control, at least among the unmarried.24 
One final legal change bears noting. Griswold shorn of 
Eisenstadt and Roe subtly but significantly alters the constitu-
tional notion of marriage. Securing the right of married couples 
to contraceptives symbolically negates the view of marriage, so 
prevalent in traditional legal and ecclesiastical circles, as a privi-
leged, even exclusive, channel for reproduction. With this ob-
servation, let's bring our legal fantasy to its logical conclusion. 
Imagine what Justice Brennan could have done with a fun-
damental rights jurisprudence based solely on Griswold. In a 
concurrence that was unusually shrewd even by his own stan-
dards, Justice Brennan in 1986 could have joined a unanimous 
Court in upholding Georgia's sodomy law. 25 Michael Hardwick 
admittedly had engaged in sodomy with someone other than his 
spouse. And marriage is "the only relationship in which [the 
government] allows sexual relations legally to take place."26 Jus-
23. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (cited in note 
2); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,67-72 (1976). 
24. Or so it might be if the states actually were fatuous enough to ban contracep-
tives. Perhaps this takes too dim a view of American legislators. That a policy is consti-
tutional doesn't make it plausible, much less prudent. It might be more realistic to 
imagine great variation among communities in age limits for contraceptive purchases and 
in contraceptive distribution policies for public schools. But adults in their 20s and 30s 
would probably encounter no serious barriers to securing contraception. 
25. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick,478 U.S.186 (1986). 
26. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,386 (1978). 
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tice Brennan would take pains, however, to note that the sod-
omy ban, "uncommonly silly" even by the low baseline set in 
Griswold,27 might present a different question if enforced against 
a married couple. 
A decade later, Hawaii might have accepted Justice Bren-
nan's transparent invitation. If incarcerated heterosexuals can 
marry,28 why not free homosexuals? In the wake of Romer v. 
Evans,29 Hawaii would become the first state to recognize mar-
riages between persons of the same sex. Citing Griswold and 
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Bowers, Hawaii's supreme 
court would invalidate the sexual classification in that state's 
marriage law.30 In an unusual joint opinion for six Justices, the 
Supreme Court of the United States could affirm: "Equality 
knows no refuge in a jurisprudence of hate. "31 The federal De-
fense of Marriage Act would lie in ruins. Heterosexual hegem-
ony over the institution of marriage would end at last. 
Thank you, Justice Jude. Exchanging Eisenstadt, Casey, and 
the meaningless shell of Roe for same-sex marriage seems an un-
commonly good swap. Call it "gay science" of a different sort: 
tracing the genealogy of constitutional morals can indeed move 
us beyond conventional notions of good and evil. Roll over, 
Blackstone; Nietzsche rules. One man's Kulturkampf is an-
h ' f . . 32 ot er s war o emancipation. 
27. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
28. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
29. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
30. In real life, Hawaii's supreme court did invalidate that state's marriage law on 
state constitutional grounds. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. a., Dec. 3, 
1996), afrd without opinion, 950 P.2d 1235 (Haw. 1997); see also Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 
44 (Haw. 1993) (requiring the state to justify the limitation of marriage to heterosexual 
couples). 
31. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey at 844 (cited in 
note 2) (altered quotation). 
32. Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) with Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971 ). 
